

that names were set down by someone" (p. 5). This is a fair judgment.

I will not go into Ademollo's detailed exegesis of the text, but will instead make one general observation about his overall interpretation of the dialogue. Ademollo puts great efforts into showing that the etymologies given at 394e–421e are substantially backed up by the Heraclitean flux theory, and in particular by its atomistic version, and that Socrates takes the etymologies seriously (see, e.g., pp. 237–41). Thus, Ademollo further develops arguments given by Grote and Sedley, opposing the other line of interpretation (given by Stallbaum and Baxter) that the section in question is parodic. Ademollo's argument is successful, and it helps to make sense of the etymologies that are otherwise very difficult to comprehend. For example, the derivation of δίκαιον "just" from διαῖον "passing through" (412d2–e3) is unintelligible if we overlook Socrates' explanation that the flux theorists posit two fundamental principles, the quick and the slow, and that δίκαιον refers to the quickness of the flux and thus to its penetrability (p. 215). In line with this, Ademollo is correct to stress (pp. 449–51) that Socrates' subsequent criticism of the flux theory would be pointless unless that theory played a significant role in the etymologies given.

I have no major complaints about this commentary. It is perhaps worth mentioning that the commentary is likely to be too demanding for a beginner, but the intended readers, graduate students and scholars, will benefit from it immensely and take pleasure in its insightful observations, comparisons with other dialogues and well-wrought arguments.

In conclusion, I should like to recommend this commentary as a first choice not only to those who take the etymologies given "seriously", but also to everyone who adopts this attitude towards the dialogue in its entirety. It is not entirely groundless to suggest either that the commentary will constitute the definitive study of the dialogue for many generations to come.

*Mika Perälä*

*Plato's Laws. A Critical Guide.* Edited by CHRISTOPHER BOBONICH. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge – New York 2010. ISBN 978-0-521-88463-1. VIII, 245 pp. GBP 50, USD 80.

Christopher Bobonich has edited an impressive collection of papers on Plato's *Laws*. The subtitle of the collection suggests that the papers are intended to introduce the general reader to the subject, but the editorial introduction reveals that the intentions behind the volume are much more ambitious. Bobonich claims that the volume "offers chapters that are on the cutting edge of current scholarship and that not only contribute to ongoing debates, but also start fresh lines of inquiry" (p. 1). As far as I can tell, this claim is for the most part well grounded, though not all contributions open up new perspectives, but rather elaborate on the contributors' earlier work in this field. In any case, the twelve chapters consist of first-rate scholarship, comprising both detailed textual exegesis and helpful overall interpretations of the *Laws* and its relationship with Plato's other dialogues, and even with Aristotle's *Politics*.

The first two chapters interpret the *Laws* as a whole, each making a rather bold new proposal. Malcolm Schofield argues that although Aristotle has been blamed for not being a very sensitive interpreter of the *Laws*, he was nevertheless correct in identifying two different projects in this treatise: one is the attempt to reconstruct a "second best" political system which is supposed to approximate to the Kallipolis of the *Republic*, and the other is to institute

a political system which is "more common". Schofield concludes that the two projects are not irreconcilable. The second project, according to him, is "subordinate" to the first in that its aim is to determine the constraints that human nature with "its resistance to or lack of interest in the life of virtue" imposes on the "idealising project" (pp. 23–4). Schofield makes a number of valuable observations, but I was not entirely persuaded by his argument that Aristotle's sweeping remark, "He [Plato in the *Laws*] intends to make the political system more common, but gradually brings it round to the other one [i.e. the one suggested in the *Republic*]" (*Pol.* 2,6,1265a3–4), really entitles us to see Aristotle identifying two different projects rather than pointing out Plato's alleged failure in implementing his original project. However, Schofield's argument is not substantially dependent on Aristotle's view, and can be judged in its own right. In my view, his considerations fail to show that there are really two different projects in the *Laws*, and, in fact, Schofield himself qualifies his initial position substantially in the course of his discussion.

Christopher Rowe also makes a bold argument, proposing in a "unitarian" fashion that "the text of the *Laws* tends specifically to *direct the reader, for the required level of justification, to arguments, and conclusions reached, in other dialogues*" (p. 35, Rowe's italics). This implies that the *Laws* presupposes "a practised Platonic reader" who attempts to make sense of the dialogue's discussion in the light of other dialogues. In effect, then, Rowe opposes a "developmentalist" reading of the *Laws*, aiming to see how this dialogue accords with the *Republic* and the *Politicus* and other dialogues touching upon the same topics. Rowe focuses on Book 4, but assumes that his approach is applicable to other books as well. To my mind, Rowe's textual exegesis is impressive, and he succeeds in making plausible the claim that the Athenian's treatment of *sophrosyne* implies philosophical reason when read in conjunction with the relevant passages in the *Republic* Book 5 and the *Politicus*. However, his approach has limitations, too. One obvious defect is that it overlooks the arguments that are genuinely innovative in comparison with other dialogues, and which cannot be justified with reference to them. Indeed, although Rowe (p. 46) claims that the laws are based on philosophical reason, he has little to say about the significance of the laws themselves, and yet this is arguably a key contribution of the dialogue to the study of *politeia*.

Richard Kraut focuses on what he calls "ordinary virtues", i.e. virtues such as moderation (*sophrosyne*) and justice (*dikaiosyne*) without adequate philosophical wisdom and knowledge about the good. In *Phaedo* 82a11 and the *Republic* 500d9, Plato refers to such virtues as "demotic" (δημοτική). Kraut's main argument is that the *Laws* puts special emphasis on the acquisition of these virtues, which are not just mere appearances of virtue, but constitute a lower order of virtue. This implies, according to Kraut, that ordinary citizens, who lack real wisdom, can nonetheless value and cultivate these virtues not just for profit, as a means to other ends, but in their own right, if only they are accustomed to exercising them through appropriate education, and are thus able to live under sufficiently wisely established laws and institutions. In focusing on "ordinary virtues", Kraut makes no attempt to explain the emphasis on the unity of all virtues, which seems to be programmatic in the passage about divine goods at 631b6–d6 (not even mentioned by Kraut). Nonetheless, he makes interesting observations on the *Republic* and the *Laws* as "complementary treatises" (p. 68). Assuming that the political system outlined in the *Laws* is second-best to the ideal of the *Republic* with respect to all social classes, he conjectures that "the working class of the Kallipolis is happier than their more leisured counterparts in Magnesia because those craftsmen and farmers live under the

constant and direct supervision of philosophers and their assistants, whereas the householders of Magnesia are ultimately ruled not by superior individuals but by laws, which, according to the *Statesman*, are by their nature crude approximations of the ideal imperatives [...]" (p. 69). The superiority of the Kallipolis, according to Kraut, is thus based on its greater sensibility to particular requirements that are not explicable by general laws.

In contrast to Kraut, Julia Annas does not acknowledge any relevant distinction between lower and higher-order virtues in the *Laws*. However, in explaining what Plato means by his idea of "slavery to the laws" (698b8–c2), she implies another distinction, namely one between laws that correctly exemplify right reason, i.e. that which is divine in human beings, and laws which are defective in this respect. In Annas's interpretation, the *Laws* clearly concentrate on the former kind of laws, and it is only to such laws that all citizens, not just ordinary citizens, but also virtuous people, can be seen as slaves (p. 74). Thus, she opposes an interpretation that fully virtuous people need no laws (p. 79). Given this notion, she focuses on the double role of the laws, the commanding and the persuasive, in an attempt to show how obedience to laws is compatible with both becoming virtuous and living a life of virtue. Interestingly, Annas finds a parallel reading of the *Laws* in Philo of Alexandria's interpretation of Mosaic law. A limitation of this approach is that it does not take into account Plato's cautious qualification that positive laws, being general by nature, do not apply to every case (875d4–5), a point which Terry Irwin reminds us of in his contribution.

Irwin starts by claiming that the *Laws* does not take a clear position on the doctrine of natural law as it is known in later natural law tradition from Cicero's *De Re Publica* onwards. However, this does not prevent him from developing some positive arguments about the content of what he calls "internal law". He claims, "This law is a rational principle that affirms the reflective supremacy of one's own happiness and the practical supremacy of the common good" (p. 104). This is Irwin's solution as to how Plato's views about self-love (including happiness) and the common good (justice, and good social relationships, "friendships") are compatible. He claims the first to be prior to the second, grounding his argument in a more general interpretation of his that we have reason to be just "if and only if justice is best for the promotion of one's own happiness" (p. 101). Irwin is very cautious in that he posits this not so much as Plato's explicit view rather than as an assumption that informs the discussion of justice and happiness in the *Laws* as well as the *Republic*.

The three subsequent chapters discuss psychological issues. Dorothea Frede demonstrates that the discussion of pleasure and pain in the *Laws* is not based on any specific theoretical model we know from Plato's other treatises (e.g. the restoration and disintegration model given in the *Gorgias*, *Philebus*, and the *Timaeus*), but rather on ordinary conceptions of these phenomena (p. 111). Frede pays special attention to Plato's puppet analogy in accounting for the inner forces and functions of the human soul, emphasizing its limited theoretical import and its explicit application only to illustrating the effect of wine-drinking (645b–c). However, she suggests, the analogy has wider significance in that it shows how even a mature citizen with a well-integrated soul faces continuous pulls in different directions, and is in need of "lifelong learning", "maintenance" and "self-improvement" with the help of public drinking parties and religious festivities serving as "a means of *moral* correction of the soul" (p. 122; Frede's italics).

Rachana Kamtekar's and Christopher Bobonich's contributions focus on non-rational motivation for human action. Whereas Frede concentrates on what is characteristic of the *Laws* as opposed to the other dialogues, Kamtekar and Bobonich substantially draw on the *Timaeus*

to make sense of the *Law's* discussion of appetitive desires and non-rational emotions such as fear and anger. In fact, their main arguments pertain to the correct understanding of the *Timaeus*, and its significance to the *Laws*, rather than the *Laws* in its own right. It is interesting that Kamtekar and Bobonich draw rather different, if not entirely opposite, conclusions from the same evidence (e.g. *Tim.* 43c4–44c4, 64a2–65a2, 70a2–71b5, 77b5–c3): whereas Kamtekar judges that the non-rational parts of the soul are motivationally self-sufficient and thus independent from the rational part, Bobonich proposes that at least some ordinary desires such as the desire for a Martini, or the desire for revenge, are conceptually informed and propositionally structured. This disagreement is partly based on a different understanding of the soul in Plato's late dialogues: Kamtekar considers that Plato kept dividing the soul into three parts, albeit only in a "protreptic" sense (p. 130), whereas Bobonich sees him as having entirely abandoned tripartition (p. 150). I fail to see what Kamtekar's qualification "protreptic" precisely implies. Instead, Bobonich's judgement, to my mind at least, seems better supported by the text (see e.g. the account of fear in terms of a belief about pain in the offing at *Laws* 644c9–d1).

The final three chapters discuss special issues which are particularly prominent in the *Laws*: Thanassis Samaras focuses on the position of women, Robert Mayhew on theology, and André Laks on the constitution of Magnesia as the "truest tragedy" (817a–b). Samaras argues that in re-establishing the *oikos* as the basic social unit, and thus denying to women the right to inherit and own property, Plato failed to give them a social role which would match their equality to men in military and public affairs (pp.196–7). Mayhew concludes that Plato identifies reason (*nous*) as the chief god (p. 216), and Laks claims that Magnesia's tragedy is manifested in the inevitable conflict between pleasure and reason, which afflicts even virtuous people with philosophical understanding (p. 231).

In conclusion, the papers constituting this collection deserve a close reading both separately and as a collection. Since the papers overlap one another on many key issues, proposing in many cases rather different views, one might have expected that the editor would have encouraged the authors to more explicitly engage in critical discussion with each other. As it stands, however, drawing the implications of each paper in relation to one another is almost entirely left to the intended specialist or graduate student reader who knows how to use the collection as a "critical guide".

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*Domninus of Larissa. Encheiridion and Spurious Works.* Introduction, critical text, English translation, and commentary by PETER RIEDLBERGER. *Mathematica Graeca Antiqua* 2. Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa – Roma 2013. ISBN 978-88-6227-567-5. 279 pp. EUR 86.

The author of the edition under review (originally presented as a doctoral thesis in the Faculty of Mathematics, Informatics and Statistics at the Ludwig-Maximilian-Universität München) is a many-sided man. A few years ago, he published an excellent commented edition of the eighth book of the *Johannis* of Corippus (whom he rebaptized as Gorippus). He now provides us with a new edition of the *Encheiridion* and the spurious works of Domninus of Larissa, preceded by a thorough introduction and followed by a likewise fundamental commentary and an English translation of the text. Domninus was a fellow student of Proclus, who wrote a mathematical